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environments are exacerbated by factors such as problematic political systems, COVID-19 and climate
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In recent years, the structural drivers and human stories of mass migration from Central America and Venezuela
have been the subject of much discussion in academic, policy and media circles. The tragedy of nearly two million
Venezuelans leaving their homeland during a humanitarian crisis and scenes of Central American women and
children fleeing the crime and violence of their countries on a long and dangerous journey to reach the United
States have captured the attention of the world. In fact, however, migration has long been part of the political,
social and humanitarian landscape of the Americas. Hemisphere has delved into this critical issue from different
perspectives, always examining the problem beyond the high-profile cases covered by the media. In this issue, guest
editor Luis Guillermo Solis, former president of Costa Rica and incoming interim director of LACC, has convened
a multidisciplinary group of scholars to examine a range of topics that may not attract wide public attention but are
significant to individuals and societies that find themselves poor and disenfranchised by conditions outside of their
control. I am grateful to President Solis and the contributors for their work in rescuing these important accounts.
I would also like to thank the many people who have made my seven years as director of LACC such a productive
and gratifying experience. FIU President Mark B. Rosenberg, Provost Ken Furton and the university’s senior
leadership understood our ambitious goals and gave us their unfailing support. A few years ago, we were designated
by the Provost as an Emerging Preeminent Program. Important resources have accompanied this designation,
allowing us to make strategic investments such as faculty cluster hires to help build the Brazil Studies Institute.
Dean John Stack was a stalwart of support; I will be forever grateful for all that he did for me professionally and for
ensuring that LACC remained one of the top Latin American and Caribbean Centers in the United States. Dean
Stack’s support is one of the key reasons why LACC, in the last two cycles, was funded and designated by the U.S.
Department of Education as a National Resource Center for Latin America.
Finally, I’d like to thank the wonderful team at LACC. Associate Director Liesl Picard’s professionalism,
leadership and dedication to our missions and goals is the reason LACC is among the top centers. It has been a
pleasure to see the growth of our research agenda under the leadership of the indefatigable Dr. José Miguel Cruz.
I am grateful to Rossie Montenegro for ensuring that I stayed out of trouble and for making sure, along with the
rest of the LACC team – Joseph Holbrook, Viroselie Caviedes, Lindsay Dudley, Madelyn Tirado, Dr. María Luisa
Veisaga, Marielena Armstrong and FIU’s extraordinary faculty and students – that LACC remain an extraordinary
place to work and study.
Frank O. Mora
Director & Professor
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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FROM THE GUEST EDITOR
For decades, Hemisphere has been a source of relevant information for anyone interested in Latin American and
Caribbean affairs. Through the years, this emblematic publication of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean
Center has provided a fresh, solid and sometimes daring perspective on the region. The present issue contributes to
this scholarly tradition by analyzing one of the most pressing and complex humanitarian and geopolitical phenomena
confronting the Americas today: migration.
Migration has been a permanent reality for countries and regions around the world for thousands of years. The result
of war, pandemics, natural disasters, internal conflicts, economic deprivation, hunger and the legitimate desire of people
to seek a better future for themselves and their families, migration occurs when human populations are forced to endure
unacceptable living conditions.
In ordinary times, most people prefer to dwell in familiar surroundings. Even when facing significant survival
challenges, social groups do not easily abandon their national or regional contexts to risk the perils that migration implies.
The uncertainties they face when arriving at their destination and the terrible circumstances in which they may be forced
to live are additional disincentives for leaving home and family behind. Even then, however, people migrate. In recent
years, they have done so by the millions, with especially significant flows coming from Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti,
the Andean region and Central America’s “Northern Triangle.”
The numbers are testimony of the dire conditions that pervade the economies and political systems of many nations
in this hemisphere. It is also a reminder of the vital need for international solidarity in dealing with the massive
displacement of vulnerable populations and putting an end to one of its most perverse yet profitable expressions: human
trafficking. This is particularly true for the United States, the preferred destination for many migrants, especially
those from this hemisphere. Other countries too, however – Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Chile and Argentina – have
become home to millions seeking refuge from oppression, insecurity, hunger and the ravaging effects of unemployment,
corruption and climate change.
This issue of Hemisphere analyzes some of the most salient cases of migration in the Americas. In addition to probing
the causes of population movements, it provides elements to better understand their impact in volatile environments
further exacerbated by the still unknown long-term effects of COVID-19. I hope that through this exercise, our readers
will be able to better understand this continental phenomenon and fathom its enduring significance for Latin America
and the Caribbean.
In closing, I would like to thank Frank Mora for his leadership during the last seven years as director of LACC and the
many contributions he made during his tenure. Frank brought LACC to new heights, ratifying its standing as one of the
most distinguished regional studies programs in the United States. We wish him much success!
Luis G. Solís
Visiting Distinguished Professor of Latin American Studies
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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New Forms of Political Banishment:

Central American Migration as
Political Response
by José Miguel Cruz

The Story of Diana
In early 2019, Diana, a 32-yearold woman living in a town in
central Honduras, was forced to
leave the country abruptly. She fled
with her partner and four children
after she was gang-raped and her
partner badly beaten by the local
clique of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).
Diana owned a small but thriving
roadside shop. Business activity
started to decline, however, when
the country was paralyzed due to
recurrent demonstrations against the
government. Hondurans had taken
to the streets to protest the decision
to privatize the public health system
and the alleged electoral fraud that
secured a new presidential term for
President Juan Orlando Hernández.
The gang had been extorting
Diana and her partner for several
months, demanding monthly
protection payments. When retail
sales dropped in the shop, Diana
turned to a loan shark for cash. As
business continued to deteriorate,
she defaulted on a payment to
MS-13. In response, gang members
assaulted her partner and took his
motorcycle, warning the couple not
to default again. Then, distressed
by the deteriorating economic
situation, Diana did something
that would be normal procedure
8
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Desahuciado está el que tiene que marchar
a vivir una cultura diferente.
León Gieco
in a society with functioning
law enforcement institutions:
She reported the assault and
extortion scheme to the police.
What happened next reveals the
broken state of the Honduran
establishment: The police leaked
the report to MS-13, and that same
night, the gang came to Diana's
house. After assaulting her and her
partner, they evicted the family from
their own home.
Leaving with the few things they
could gather that night, the family
joined one of the migrant caravans
headed to the United States. During
the strenuous journey, they were
repeatedly assaulted and abused
by criminals and the authorities
alike in Honduras, Guatemala and
Mexico. Diana developed a medical
condition that forced them to pause
their journey and seek medical
assistance in Mexico City, where she
underwent surgery.
Recounting this harrowing
experience months later in a migrant
refugee center in Mexico, Diana
was upset by her gullibility in
trusting the Honduran police. She
felt betrayed by the authorities that
were supposed to protect civilians.
Ultimately, it was the corruption
and ineffectiveness of the country’s
institutions that pushed the

family out of the country. In her
retelling of the experience, Diana
acknowledged that she used to
deride people who migrated north.
She thought then that her country,
despite its chronic problems,
provided opportunities to everyone
who wanted to work and could
navigate insecurity. Her experience
was a painful lesson that put an end
to this illusion.
This article addresses the
problematic of “unconventional”
outmigration from Central America.
The phenomenon grabbed the
world’s attention in 2018, when
thousands of Central American
citizens, mainly from Honduras,
Guatemala and El Salvador,
banded together in large groups to
travel in caravans through Mexico
toward the United States. Central
Americans, however, have been
leaving their homelands in large
numbers for several decades. While
the immediate causes of emigration
have shifted across time, they reflect
structural problems of poverty
and inequality. These issues have
prevailed in the region for years,
aggravated by chronic political
instability and autocratic regimes
that, in turn, contribute to fuel
the diaspora. The recent surge in
Central American emigration can
be viewed as a result of the failure of

Feature

local political systems to respond to
the needs of vulnerable populations
while perpetuating inequity
and impunity.
The focus of this article is the
so-called Northern Triangle of
Central America, a subregion
comprised of Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador and the origin of
the recent migrant caravans to the
United States. The main source of
evidence is a pilot study conducted
by Florida International University’s
Kimberly Green Latin American and
Caribbean Center (LACC) of nearly
120 Central American migrants who
left their countries in 2019 to travel
to the United States and Mexico.
Two-thirds of the respondents were
citizens of Honduras, while the
rest came from El Salvador and
Guatemala. The sample included
very few Nicaraguans. Participants
were interviewed in migrant and
refugee centers in the Mexican cities
of Tapachula, Toluca and Mexico
City in August 2019.
A staggering surge in migration
Diana’s case is a representative
example of the ordeals suffered by
many of the Central Americans who
have flocked to the US-Mexican
border in recent years. According
to data from the Migration Policy
Institute, in fiscal year 2018 the
US Customs and Border Patrol
apprehended more than 38,000
unaccompanied children and
nearly 104,000 people traveling
in family groups from El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras. Those
numbers tripled the following
year. During the first nine months
of fiscal year 2019, the border
patrol stopped more than 350,000
migrants traveling in family groups
from the Northern Triangle.
According to the LACC pilot study,
nearly 46% of respondents cited
security reasons, including threats

A Honduran child and her mother, fleeing poverty and violence in their home country, wait
along the border bridge after being denied entry from Mexico into the U.S. on June 25, 2018
in Brownsville, Texas. More than 2,300 immigrant children were separated from their parents
due to the Trump Administration’s zero-tolerance policy for border crossers, which has since been
reversed. SPENCER PLATT/Getty Images

or attacks by criminal groups, as
their main reason for leaving their
countries. A significant portion of
the interviewees, 28.5% – most of
them from the Northern Triangle,
ranging in age from 18 to 72 – also
pointed to lack of opportunity,
unemployment, poverty and
food insecurity.
As noted earlier, Central American
migration to the United States
is not a new phenomenon. The
Migration Policy Institute estimates
that in 2017, more than 3.5 million
Central America immigrants lived in
the United States. Salvadorans and
Guatemalans constituted the largest
groups: 1.4 million and nearly one
million, respectively. Some migrated
to the United States during the civil
wars and political conflicts that
ravaged the region during the 1980s,
but in the decades that followed, as
the political instability subsided, a
new type of crisis emerged. Central

American countries, especially
those in the Northern Triangle,
struggled to generate sustainable
economic growth. Honduras,
which did not experience civil
war in the 1980s, was especially
hard hit by a combination of
weak and exclusionary economic
performance and natural disasters.
According to a study published in
The Latin Americanist, the number
of Honduran immigrants in the
United States swelled from 109,000
in 1990 to nearly 300,000 in 2000,
approaching half a million in 2009.
The numbers surged even more in
2014, when a paper in the Journal
of Human Rights and Social Work
reported that apprehensions of
unaccompanied children had risen
77% from the previous year. Arrests
of family groups went from 14,855
in 2013 to 68,445 in 2014, a 361%
increase. The largest groups of
immigrants were Hondurans
and Salvadorans.
Hemisphere Volume 29
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Although immigration from
the Northern Triangle of Central
America has experienced some
cyclical trends since 2015, it
has never stopped, and the
overall numbers keep growing in
comparison with immigrants from
other Latin American regions.
Furthermore, as the Pew Research
Center has reported, most of the
newcomers are undocumented
immigrants.
Permanent vital emergency
Most explanations of the current
migrant crisis originating in Central
America focus on the recurring
economic and security issues in
the region. More than 40 years
ago, Ignacio Martín-Baró, a social
psychologist assassinated by the
Salvadoran army, described most
Central Americans as living in a
permanent state of vital emergency.
Social and economic conditions
pushed them to a daily scramble
for survival, a situation that many
observers blamed for the devastating
civil wars of the 1980s.
Today, impoverished
Guatemalans, Hondurans and
Salvadorans continue to flee from
violence, financial hardship and
lack of opportunity. The Northern
Triangle nations remain poor, with
per capita GDP below $5,000, and
are besieged by staggering levels of
criminal violence. Street gangs and
violent criminal organizations rule
city neighborhoods, towns and vast
rural areas. A 2015 study by the
Salvadoran government concluded
that nearly 500,000 of the country’s
citizens were associated with gangs
and criminal groups. Funded largely
by extortion, these groups target
mostly poor urban barrios, demanding
a “security” fee from grocery stores,
family businesses and small farmers.
They also tax big companies by
10
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charging monthly fees to allow
their distributors and employees to
circulate in gang-controlled territory.
According to InSight Crime, a news
outlet that reports on security and
organized crime in the region,
Salvadorans pay approximately $400
million in extortion fees to such
groups every year. Hondurans pay
nearly $200 million and Guatemalans,
$61 million.
Indicators of lethal violence are
even worse. Over the last decade,
according to the United Nations,
the homicide rate in the Northern
Triangle nations has surpassed
40 per 100,000 inhabitants. In
2013-2015, it was closer to 100
per 100,000 in El Salvador and
Honduras. In comparison, the
average global homicide rate in
2017 was 6.1 per 100,000. In
the 2010s, the murder rate in the
Northern Triangle was consistently
seven times higher than in the rest
of the world.
On the economic front,
structural reform and international
cooperation programs have failed
to create sustainable economic
growth in any of the Northern
Triangle countries. Efforts to
revamp their economies after the
“lost decade” of the 1980s have
done little to alleviate the economic
insecurity of a majority of Central
American citizens. Although the
economic reforms promoted by the
Washington Consensus stabilized
public finances and generated
modest economic growth, they
failed to increase the fiscal capacity
of governments to respond to the
demands of the population. Instead
of ensuring wealth and economic
stability for the majority of citizens,
the massive privatization of stateowned companies left thousands
of workers unemployed. Many
skilled employees were forced to

migrate from the formal sector of
the economy, where they paid taxes
and had social security benefits,
toward activities characterized by
informality, job uncertainty and
low wages. Substantial cuts in
public expenditures slashed social
programs in education, housing and
healthcare that could have mitigated
the harsh social conditions faced
by underprivileged populations.
Dispossessed Guatemalans,
Hondurans and Salvadorans arrived
at the new millennium without
the human and social capital to
overcome the natural disasters
and recession of the late 2000s.
According to different sources, by
the mid-2000s, approximately half
of the populations of El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras remained
below their national poverty lines.
With those levels of poverty, as
Diana’s case illustrates, any minor
disruption on the economic front
poses a direct threat to survival for
many citizens.
Political failure
Chronic violence, unemployment
and poverty are not the only issues
pushing Central Americans out
of their homelands. Behind the
massive migrant caravans that
disrupted the region in 2018 is a
profound sense of political and
social failure. Ninety-one percent
of respondents in the LACC study
said that the political systems of
their countries did not protect
their fundamental rights as citizens.
Among Hondurans, the percentage
was 96%.
Hondurans have accounted for
most of the spikes in the migrant
caravans from Central America. Like
the other Northern Triangle nations,
Honduras has been beset by social
problems and natural disasters, but
the critical dysfunctionality of its

McAllen, Texas-September 21, 2016: A Border Patrol agent takes a group of Central Americans into custody for illegally crossing the Rio Grande into
the U.S. A flood of mothers with children and unaccompanied minors from Central America fleeing gang violence began crossing illegally in 2016.
VICHINTERLANG/iStock by Getty Images.

political system has set it apart from
its neighbors. Corrupt national
leadership, weak institutions and a
lack of accountability of the security
forces have depleted national
resources and thwarted efforts to
establish the rule of law. These
shortcomings were on full display
in the events leading up to the 2009
coup d’état and they have continued
to pervade society since then. In
response, Hondurans have turned to
the same solution their Guatemalan
and Salvadoran neighbors have used
for decades: emigration.
In the 1990s, the Northern
Triangle countries became electoral
democracies, reformed their criminal
justice institutions and opened
their economies in an attempt to
boost development and prosperity.
Political reforms sought to establish
the appropriate institutions to
strengthen the rule of law, guarantee
human rights protections, and make
political institutions more responsive
to the demands and needs of
the population. The recent surge
of families and unaccompanied
minors flooding the border has
called into question the success of
those reforms. The mass migration
of Hondurans, Guatemalans
and Salvadorans is linked to the

institutional failures that have
curbed and sidetracked the societal
transformations that were the goal
of political liberalization.
The comprehensive political
transitions of the 1990s are a
critical feature of Central America’s
recent history. Those transitions
were marked by promising peace
processes and institutional reforms
that ended military dictatorships
and bloody internal conflicts. They
were supposed to pave the way for
democratization. In Guatemala and
El Salvador, elections and limited
alternation of power started in the
mid-1980s, but reforms aimed to
guarantee human rights and the
rule of law were not implemented
until the 1990s as a direct result of
political pacts and peace agreements
between the national governments
and leftist guerrillas. In Honduras,
the military renounced control over
the Executive Branch in the early
1980s but remained a dominant
force in charge of the security
apparatus through 1998, when this
power was handed to civilians.
The fundamental goal of the peace
processes was to curb the state’s
power to tyrannize the population,
a hallmark of Central American

political systems throughout history,
especially in the Northern Triangle.
Many citizens in Central America
saw the political transitions as a
historic opportunity to construct
new societies, not merely as an
arrangement between disaffected
elites to end armed conflicts. In the
mid-1990s, there was a generalized
feeling in Central America that
ending the wars and restoring—or
establishing—democratic regimes
offered an opportunity to rebuild
the region, not only materially and
economically, but also socially and
culturally. Many Central Americans
shared a sense of optimism about
the future. In fact, the Salvadoran
government has estimated that
during the first 14 months following
the end of the civil war, more than
300,000 Salvadorans living abroad
returned home, eager to rebuild
their lives in the country.
Almost from the start, however,
holdovers and operators from
the old regimes began eroding
the new institutional framework.
They found common cause in
corrupt politicians, past human
rights abusers, and economic elites
interested in maintaining their
privileges and impunity. The new
regimes implemented the reforms
Hemisphere Volume 29
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more in form than in substance.
Very few military operators faced trials
for past human rights abuses, while
some joined the ranks of criminal
organizations. Impunity served
them well. Liberalization of electoral
competition with weak accountability
mechanisms allowed crooked
politicians to run for office under
the protection of economic elites.
Once in power, they took advantage
of the Washington Consensus
reforms to hand over the most
profitable state companies to their
cronies and dismantle most regulatory
and accountability institutions.
In the end, political reform failed
to strengthen institutions, reduce
impunity or curtail the exclusionary
effects of economic policies.
Many Salvadorans—followed by
Guatemalans and Hondurans—
turned their sights back to the
north, to the United States. By the
2010s, Salvadorans constituted the
second largest community of Latin
American immigrants in the United
States, after Mexicans.
Exit as political response
In the late 1970s, Albert O.
Hirschman, a political economist
who fled Nazi Germany in the
years before the Second World
War, advanced a theory to explain
citizens’ responses to political
dissatisfaction. He argued that
a person dissatisfied with the
way her country is governed has
essentially two options to express
her discontent. The first one is
voice. Through electoral systems
and periodic voting, citizens can
express their opinions publicly
with the expectation that electing
a different ruler or political
program will produce changes in
the country. The second option
is exit. The citizen may decide to
leave the country and its political
12
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system altogether if the expected
changes do not occur and hope
for reform is lost. Democratic
political systems with functioning
institutions provide plenty of space
for voice. They generally respond
to expectations for change or infuse
people with hope that specific
reforms and policies are possible.
Other political systems, however,
are more prone to push their
people out because they convince
their constituents that desirable
improvements are unattainable.
They end up alienating citizens to
the point that significant changes are
no longer feasible.
Many Central Americans who
have joined the ranks of migrants
toward the United States and Mexico
are not only fleeing chronic poverty
and violence; in addition to these
factors, they have given up hope that
national institutions will respond to
their plight and work for their safety
and well-being. These migrants are
abandoning political societies that
have ignored their problems and
failed to respect their voices. In the
LACC study of Central Americans in
transit through Mexico, respondents
typically indicated that they had
abandoned any hope that their
governments or institutions would
make a difference in their precarious
lives. When asked how much they
respected the political institutions in
their countries, 68% said that they
had little or no respect for them.
Among Hondurans, the largest
group in the sample, this percentage
reached 74.4%.
Comparing the results of
LACC’s migration pilot study with
those of Vanderbilt University’s
AmericasBarometer (AB) survey
helps shed light on the impact
of popular disappointment with
political institutions. The AB survey
taps perceptions and opinions of

political institutions and events. It
is a regional project, unique in its
scope, nature and commitment to the
scientific method. The surveys from
which these data are drawn were
carried out in the three Northern
Triangle countries with samples of
more than 1,500 interviewees per
country. Since the LACC pilot study
on migration used the same questions
as the AB survey, the results allow
for a direct comparison between
the opinions of Central American
migrants in transit in Mexico and
their compatriots interviewed by
Vanderbilt University in their
home countries. Although the
LACC sample is not representative
of the Central American migrant
population as a whole, it provides a
window onto the political views of
people who leave their countries in
comparison with those who stay.
Table 1 compares the results of
the migrant sample in the LACC
pilot study with the national results
of the AB survey to show the share
of the population expressing trust
or support for political institutions
in each country. The first group of
opinions refers to what David Easton
has called diffuse support for political
institutions; that is, long-term
attitudes toward abstract institutions.
The second group of opinions taps
into what he calls specific support
for political institutions, reflecting
the level of public trust in concrete
manifestations of the political system:
the legislature, the presidency,
security forces, political parties and the
electoral apparatus. The results of the
migrant sample are not disaggregated
by nationality, given the low
number of cases in the pilot study.
The data in Table 1 reveal a
remarkable contrast between the
views of the migrant population
in the pilot study and those of the

Table 1. Percentage of Central Americans expressing support for the political system
Opinions

Migrant
sample

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Diffuse support
Believe that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the
political system of their country

6.0

26.8

26.3

23.9

25.9

64.7

58.8

48.8

8.6

36.4

37.0

32.1

22.9

56.1

58.7

44.9

7.6

26.4

27.7

25.3

11.2

27.3

23.3

28.0

6.0

31.9

28.7

25.7

Trust the Armed Forces in their home country

13.5

56.8

60.0

47.4

Trust the National Police in their home country

7.7

44.4

30.9

33.8

Trust political parties in their home country

8.5

17.1

25.9

16.2

12.6

38.3

31.6

21.7

Respect the political institutions of their country
Feel proud to live under the political system of their country
Believe one should support the political system
Believe that the courts in their home country guarantee a fair trial
Specific support
Trust the President of their home country
Trust the National Congress in their home country

Trust the electoral process in their home country

Sources: LAPOP, Statistical Compendium 2018/2019. Weighted Tabulations of Core Variables. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2018/
Statistical_Compendium_2018-19_W_10.22.19.pdf: LACC, Central American Migration Pilot Study. Preliminary Results.

average citizen in the Northern
Triangle countries. While both
populations express generally low
levels of support for the overall
and specific institutions of their
nations, migrants tend to manifest
even lower levels of support for
political institutions than citizens
who have stayed at home. Only
6% of the Central American
migrants interviewed in the pilot
study believed that their rights were
protected under the political systems
of their countries, compared to
nearly a quarter of the in-country
respondents in the Vanderbilt
survey. While most people in
the Northern Triangle expressed
disappointment in their political
systems, the rate of disenchantment
was even higher among migrants.
With regard to feelings of respect,
pride and general support for
political institutions, the results
also show a clear difference between
the transient sample of Central
Americans interviewed in Mexico

and their fellow citizens surveyed
in their home countries. Another
telling indicator is perceptions of
whether the courts in the home
country guarantee a fair trial. Less
than 8% of the migrants believed
they could expect fair treatment
by their countries’ justice systems,
indicating profound distrust in
one of the institutions key to
upholding the rule of law and
combatting impunity.
Data on specific institutions show
those contrasts even more clearly.
All of the critical components of the
political system – the presidency,
legislature, security forces and
political parties – received dismal
reviews with regard to public trust.
According to the AB survey, less
than one-third of Central Americans
in their home countries trust the
presidency, the parliament or
political parties. Nearly all migrants
interviewed for the LACC pilot
study, however, indicated their lack

of confidence in these institutions.
Lawmakers and political parties,
the institutions that are supposed
to represent the interests of the
population, enjoy the lowest
levels of trust among Northern
Triangle citizens.
Interestingly, the comparison
between the AB survey and
the migrant study also shows a
substantial gap in confidence in
security forces. While in-home
respondents in the Northern
Triangle reported limited trust in
their national armies and police
organizations, migrants graded
them as poorly as they did civilian
institutions. Diana’s testimonial
helps explain this distrust. Many
Central American refugees are
fleeing not only ineffectual political
institutions, but also security
forces that collude with criminal
organizations to prey on the
most vulnerable.
Hemisphere Volume 29
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Policy responses?
The results of the LACC pilot
study are unambiguous: Many, if not
most, Central American migrants
seeking to settle in the north have
given up hope in the political
institutions of their home countries.
Many come from communities
controlled by gangs and criminal
organizations, where they have
been continually threatened and
victimized. These same communities
often suffer from a lack of basic
services, unemployment, protracted
droughts and failed harvests. Those
leaving home are driven by severe
social conditions that threaten their
very survival, but failed political
institutions are also a factor. More
than two decades of political
reforms, economic transformations
and regular elections peppered by
occasional political crises have been
unable to guarantee a decent life
and stable future for most Central
Americans. For many citizens of the
region, emigration seems like the
only path to survival.
In the United States, the policy
debate about mass immigration

from the Northern Triangle has
swung between two short-sighted
responses. One has been to inject
millions of dollars into assistance
programs for development in the
region. The other is to shut down
the southern border as part of a
wider set of draconian immigration
policies. After several decades, wellintentioned aid programs seeking
dramatic short-term outcomes but
lacking proper accountability have
done little except enrich corrupt
operators in the Northern Triangle.
The second response, curtailing
immigration, may have cut down
on the numbers of undocumented
immigrants entering the US, but
it has created a humanitarian crisis
in Mexico and other neighboring
countries. The strains it has created
have resulted in more violence, death
and desperation across the region.
Washington needs to reshuffle
its approach to Central American
immigration. Given the urgent
problems of structural inequality
and chronic violence in the region,
the US response should concentrate
on the creation of democratically
accountable institutions and far-

reaching efforts to uproot corruption
and impunity from key political
institutions. Plans that favor
strengthening security forces to
police migrants and the dispossessed
in their countries of origin should be
rejected. They will only add to the
misery of communities besieged by
criminal organizations.
Doing anything less than
addressing the root, institutional
causes of inequality and crime in
Central America will amount to
a decision to continue supporting
questionable political leaders and
lining the pockets of criminals. The
problem requires a balanced effort
that ties traditional developmentrelated assistance to forceful
accountability campaigns in the
public sector. This must include
an unwavering commitment to
removing crooked officials and
remodeling Central America’s
democratic institutions to make
them better capable of fighting
injustice, corruption and impunity.
Otherwise, Diana’s experience will
continue to repeat itself in the
suffering of thousands of migrants
and refugees across the region.
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The Venezuelan Migratory Crisis and
Its Impact on Colombia
by Francesca Ramos Pismataro & Ronal F. Rodríguez

A

s of April 2020,
nearly one-third,
or 30.59%, of the
Venezuelan population
was in a situation
of human mobility, according to
official figures from the Colombian
government and the United Nations.
This number represents 9,974,515
of the country’s estimated total
population of 32,605,423. Of
these, 5,093,987 have migrated
in response to the complex and
prolonged humanitarian emergency
that has afflicted the country in
recent years, joining approximately
500,000 Colombian citizens who
had been living in Venezuela
but have since returned to their
country of origin. An additional
4,880,528 people cross the porous
border between Colombia and
Venezuela daily, part of a pendular
migration equivalent to 14.96% of
the Venezuelan population. These
short-term migrants depend on
trips to Colombia for basic goods
and services, staying anywhere from
several hours to several months at
a time. Their presence has had a
significant impact on Colombian
society and the nation’s resources.
While Venezuelans who go back
and forth to Colombia cannot strictly
be considered migrants, given that
they do not reside definitively in
another country, they reflect the
dimensions of the phenomenon of
human mobility between these two
countries. They are also the only
group of Venezuelan migrants for
whom official figures are available,

thanks to the Tarjetas de Movilidad
Fronteriza – Border Mobility Cards –
issued by the Colombian government
to regulate the legal traffic of
Venezuelans into the country. In
theory, cardholders must remain
within a prescribed radius from the
border, but over time many have
ventured further afield, reaching as
far as Bogotá, approximately 366
miles from the frontier.

able to obtain the documentation
necessary for foreign travel. In
early 2020, the official fee for a
Venezuelan passport was US$196, an
impossible figure for most citizens.
On the black market, the going price
approached US$2,000. As a result,
the only option for most Venezuelans
is to cross the border with Colombia,
a route increasingly under threat
from human trafficking networks.

Venezuela has also experienced
a significant wave of internal
displacement. An undetermined
number of people have migrated in
search of scarce goods and services,
paralleling the collapse of the public
utility infrastrcture (electricity,
drinking water, propane). Venezuela’s
most populous state, Zulia in the
northwest, has been particularly hard
hit by the decline in public services,
receiving electricity on a rotating sixhour schedule. Daily temperatures
in the region average around 86º
F, making refrigeration impossible.
Estimates indicate that around 15%
of Zulia’s 4.3 million inhabitants
have migrated in three directions:
1) to other countries; 2) to the state
of Táchira, the easiest crossing point
to the main Colombian border city
of Cúcuta; and 3) to the Venezuelan
capital of Caracas, 433 miles away.

Officially, more than 10 million
people have been affected by human
mobility in Venezuela, including
migrants, people crossing the border
temporarily, displaced persons and
returnees, but the number could
in fact be much higher, taking
into account rampant problems
with documentation, passports
and identification. Colombia is
by far the country most affected
by the phenomenon: As of April
2020, Colombia had an estimated
1,825,687 Venezuelans within its
borders. Of these, only 43.78%,
or 799,373, had legalized their
status. The remaining 56.21%, or
1,026,305, were in the country
illegally, although undocumented
status is not currently a crime
in Colombia.

The government of Nicolás
Maduro has limited the rights of
Venezuelans to travel internationally
and attempted to deny the
phenomenon of human mobility.
In practice, only those citizens with
sufficient financial resources are

Of the legal migrants, 568,330
have a Special Residency Permit
(PEP), a temporary status Colombia
has created to protect Venezuelans
who remain in the country for
more than 180 days. The permits
have been issued at various times,
free of charge and lasting two years.
In recent years, the Colombian
Hemisphere Volume 29
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immigration agency, Migración
Colombia, has been automatically
renewing permits set to expire, in a
display of solidarity with
Venezuelan migrants.
Unlike their counterparts in Chile,
Peru or Ecuador, the Colombian
authorities have realized that it is
unrealistic to expect Venezuelans
to produce visas or additional
documentation when their permits
expire. In addition to granting
permission to be in the country, the
PEP gives migrants access to health
care, education and a work permit.
The best Venezuelans who migrate
to Ecuador and Peru can hope for is
a humanitarian visa, issued at a cost
of US$50 in Ecuador. This amount
is out of reach for many migrants
from Venezuela, where the average
monthly wage was around US $4.32
as of May 2020.

Venezuelan migrants climb on a truck on the road
from Cúcuta to Pamplona, in Norte de Santander
Department, Colombia, on February 10, 2019.
RAUL ARBOLEDA/AFP via Getty Images.
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The Colombian government has
also begun granting nationality to
children born in Colombia between
2015 and 2021 to Venezuelan
parents. So far, 27,825 children
have benefited from this measure.
Colombia normally does not follow
the principle of Jus Soli (birthright
citizenship), but given the fact that
no Venezuelan consulates have
been operational in Colombia since
February 22, 2019, and that the
Venezuelan government has denied
citizenship to some children born
across the border, the authorities in
Bogotá have opted to award them
nationality to ensure they are not
stateless and that they have access
to basic rights. Regardless of their
migratory status, all Venezuelan
children have a right to free education
in Colombia, although only about
one-third are estimated to be taking
advantage of this benefit. In 2019,
approximately 198,597 Venezuelan
children and teenagers matriculated
into Colombian schools. Many of
them were significantly behind their

Colombian counterparts, obliging
the government to invest additional
resources into remedial classes and
other measures.
The situation has been even more
complicated when it comes to
health care. The Colombian state
provides free emergency care to all
residents, regardless of nationality.
This has been an important lifeline
for Venezuelan migrants, given the
widespread lack of basic medical
services in their country. Nonemergency care remained out of
reach to most until January 2020,
when migrants were permitted to
access the social security-based and
subsidized health care systems. As
noted above, PEP holders also have
the same rights to health care as
Colombian citizens.
Colombia is a country without
much experience in managing
immigration. Its prolonged armed
conflict made it unattractive when
compared to many other South
American countries, which saw
large waves of immigration in the
twentieth century. For decades, the
biggest challenge facing the country
was internal migration as a result of
internal violence, which displaced
around 7.5 million people. In
response to the Venezuelan crisis,
NGOs and Colombian civil groups
have joined the government’s efforts
to manage the flow of migrants. In
the region along the border with
Venezuela, for example, the Catholic
Church has established soup kitchens
to feed the influx of migrants. One
such soup kitchen, known as Divina
Providencia, employs 300 volunteers
to provide breakfast and lunch to
more than 5,000 people each day.
Generosity has its limits, however,
and after more than five years of
the migratory crisis Colombian
society is beginning to show signs
of compassion fatigue. Tensions

between Colombian communities
and Venezuelan migrants have
bubbled over into violence, and
xenofobia and aporophobia have
become more widespread. Political
actors have emerged to exploit
these fears, which have found fertile
ground in a society with its own
structural deficits to address.
Perhaps the greatest challenge
is the reluctance to view the flow
of migrants from Venezuela as a
long-term phenomenon that will
transform Colombian society.
Venezuelan immigrants require
sustained measures for socioeconomic
integration. Until now, the
Colombian government and society
in general have taken an assistancebased and humanitarian approach
to the problem. While admirable
in terms of its generosity, this
approach lacks a long-term vision.
The flood of migrants crossing its
borders represents an opportunity for
Colombia to develop an immigration
policy that responds to the human
mobility challenges affecting Latin
America today.
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Bolivian Immigration in
Argentina: Continuity or Change?
by Roberto Benencia

I

mmigration to Argentina
from the Plurinational State
of Bolivia, while a later
phenomenon than the waves
of Bolivian immigration to
other countries in the region, has
been one of the most successful in
terms of the migrants’ prospects in
the host country, particularly with
regard to the variety of occupations
they have been able to pursue there.
Until the mid twentieth century,
intra-regional migration in Latin
America was characterized by
movements between neighboring
countries, by rural-rural or ruralurban flows, and was often seasonal
in nature. Argentina has long been
a central pole of attraction for these
flows. Bolivia, although an exporter
of people to neighboring lands for
centuries, saw such outflows pick up
significantly in the 1950s, spurred
by changes brought about by the
1952 revolution and the wave of
import substitution industrialization
in Argentina.
In this context, Bolivian migration
to Argentina was fueled by regional
economic growth and expansion
around the 1930s, bringing with
it a growing demand for rural
labor. In northeastern Argentina,
for example, the sugarcane and
tobacco plantations of Salta and
Jujuy required seasonal workers to
harvest and process these crops, as
did the burgeoning wine industry
in Mendoza. Different growing
seasons created a steady demand for
labor throughout the year, as did
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the need for unskilled workers in
Argentina’s cities.
Starting in the late 1960s,
the growing mechanization of
production processes – especially in
the sugar industry – and lower prices
for many regional products began
to reorient regional migration flows,
leading workers to look beyond
traditional cross-border migration
to the opportunities presented by
the Buenos Aires metropolitan
area, especially in the construction
sector. By 1970, more than onethird of Bolivians in Argentina
were concentrated in Buenos Aires,
with Argentina’s 1980 census
showing that, for the first time,
more Bolivian migrants resided
in that city than in the country’s
northeast (Salta and Jujuy). Their
exact numbers, however, have been
more difficult to determine, given
the universal challenge of counting
undocumented immigrants.
To understand what draws
migrants from other Latin American
countries to Argentina, Adriana
Marshall and Dora Orlansky (1983)
conducted a comparative study of
Bolivian, Chilean and Paraguay
an immigration to that country
in 1970-1976. After interviewing
migrants from these countries
about the conditions that drove
them to migrate, the authors found
that in Bolivia – the country with
the most factors pointing in that
direction and the least capacity to
absorb its excess rural work force
– people did not turn to migration

in the elevated numbers that might
have been expected. Despite
offering even fewer possibilities for
employment than Paraguay, due
to higher urban unemployment
and underemployment rates, as
well as a more limited agricultural
sector, Bolivia had a higher rate of
internal vs foreign migration. One
explanation, the authors suggested,
is that Bolivia shares a much shorter
border with Argentina than do Chile
and Paraguay. As a result, a smaller
portion of the Bolivian population
is exposed directly to cross-border
pull. In fact, residents of this border
region account for the bulk of
Bolivian migrants to Argentina.
Marshall and Orlansky identified
additional elements contributing to
migration, among them a tradition
of emigration to a particular
destination, especially in association
with certain economic activities.
These activities in turn often have a
multiplying effect that draws other
migrants from the sending country.
Finally, factors such as wage
differences between the sending and
receiving country, and immigration
policy toward migrants from specific
countries, also play an important
role in population movements.
Bolivian migration to Argentina,
the authors note, began relatively
recently (1950s) when compared to
the other two countries under study.
Bolivia’s socioeconomic structure
was characterized historically by
a servile role for the rural sector,
keeping the population tied to

Dancing woman in traditional dress celebrate Bolivian Carnival in Buenos Aires, Argentina on October 21, 2018. Despite a long history of Bolivian
migration to Argentina and associated adaptation, Bolivian migrants young and old still make an effort to preserve and practice their culture and
traditions. NATALIA SO/iStock by Getty Images.

the land and constituting a basic
impediment to labor mobility.
It wasn’t until the 1970s that
Bolivia began to see an increase in
internal migration, a phenomenon
already commonplace in Chile and
Paraguay. In the authors’ study,
41% of interdepartmental migration
in Bolivia had occurred between
1971 and 1976.
In contrast to migrants from other
neighboring countries (especially
Paraguay and Uruguay), who tend
to concentrate in Buenos Aires
and its metropolitan area, the
2010 Argentine census and many
studies have found that Bolivian
immigrants – despite the fact
that many settle in these areas as

well – are more evenly distributed
around the country. Bolivians
participate in a wide variety of
occupations, including agricultural
and clothing production, food and
clothing sales, construction work
and domestic service. Wherever
they settle, they make an effort to
preserve their culture, celebrating
traditional holidays and wearing
their traditional dress.
Fruit and vegetable production
is one of the main activities of
Bolivian migrants in Argentina. In
agricultural areas serving the Greater
Buenos Aires region and, indeed,
around the country, Bolivians have
become the primary workforce,
gradually replacing previous waves

of migrants from Italy, Portugal
and Japan.
Over time, a minority of Bolivian
agricultural workers have risen
from the category of simple peons
to owning their own land and, in
some cases, have become wholesale
distributors of fruit and vegetables.
Some have even been able to break
away from crop production, a
physically demanding occupation
that exposes its practitioners to
dangerous agricultural chemicals.
In particular, the children of
Bolivian agricultural workers often
express a strong desire to seek other
employment, and many
have succeeded.
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Unexpected Guests: Cuban and
Haitian Migrants in Costa Rica,
2015-2017
by Luis G. Solís

I

n late October 2015, the
Costa Rican Migration Police
broke up a band of coyotes
that had been operating in
the country for several years.
Mostly devoted to trafficking Cuban
nationals traveling by foot from
Ecuador, the band had successfully
moved thousands of people across
the border with Nicaragua on their
way to the United States.
Cuban migrants had been hiding
in Costa Rica, moving gradually
towards the north as they recovered
from their hazardous journey
through Colombia and Panama,
since at least 2008. They did so by
taking advantage of favorable laws
that granted them automatic asylum
upon reaching US territory. They
also benefitted from the Ecuadorian
government’s policy of “universal
citizenship,” which at the time did
not require visas for admittance
into that country. These special
circumstances, in addition to the
Cuban government’s willingness
to issue passports to any national
leaving the island, contributed to the
start of a new diaspora. The flow of
migrants intensified in 2012, when
rumors circulated in Havana that the
US would soon reverse its privileged
migration status for Cubans.
In less than two months, between
October and December 2015,
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Cuban arrivals in Costa Rica rose
from 1500 to more than 8000.
All were halted on the border with
Nicaragua, in one of the poorest
regions of Costa Rica, deprived
of significant social services and
with scarce lodging facilities. The
impasse was the result of the
unwillingness of the Nicaraguan
government (and, later, most other
Central American governments,
with the exception of Panama)
to allow free passage to Cuban
migrants. Thanks to the personal
involvement of Presidents Enrique
Peña Nieto of Mexico and Juan
Carlos Varela of Panama, as well as
two airline companies, several bus
operators that offered their services
to the migrants at cost value, and a
lot of hard work of by Costa Rican
authorities and diplomats, the
situation was finally resolved. The
Costa Rican government was able
to arrange a “land and air bridge”
to the Mexico-US border, and by
early April 2016, all of the Cuban
migrants had settled in their
new destinations.

years of the Nicaraguan Revolution
in the 1970s. Diplomatically, the
situation was also tense: Cuba,
Colombia, Ecuador, the Central
American countries, Mexico and
the United States all had different
agendas for dealing with the
migrants. The existing multilateral
framework was fragile, due to
the (mostly) economic nature of
the migrants, and the unrealistic
categorization of Costa Rica
as a “middle-to-high” human
development country not eligible
to receive significant cooperation
from the international community.
Fortunately, unlike other migrants,
who typically lack even the minimal
resources to survive, Cubans tended
to have at least some financial
resources, either their own or
assistance provided by family
and friends, which they accessed
through financial intermediaries
along the way. These resources
made it possible for them to pay for
their transportation to the US and
obtain food and lodging at private
establishments in Costa Rica.

The Costa Rican government,
suffering from an endemic fiscal
deficit, lacked the financial resources
to provide humanitarian support to
this unexpected wave of migrants.
Neither did it have in place the
protocols to deal with such a large
migrant contingent, which Costa
Rica had not experienced since the

In 2016, an estimated 30,000
Cubans were living in Ecuador,
most of them aspiring to migrate
to the US. Had the surge of
migration continued, the stage
would have been set for a major
crisis. Ultimately, however, the
flow stopped in response to a
combination of public and private

Cubans wave goodbye to friends departing by bus from La Cruz, Guanacaste, Costa Rica to go to the airport in nearby Liberia on January 12, 2016.
Elation and trepidation gripped the first group of Cuban migrants to fly out of Costa Rica on a trial air-and-land journey to start new lives in the
United States. CARLOS GONZALEZ/AFP via Getty Images.

policies. First, Ecuador abandoned
its universal citizenship model
and began requiring travel visas
for Cubans entering the country.
Second, Cuba restricted the number
of passports issued to citizens
traveling to Ecuador. And lastly, the
US came to the realization that the
special privileges it offered Cubans
were indeed a magnet for migrants
from the island and eventually
ended them with significant
bipartisan support.
Another flow of migrants
appeared at the Costa Rican border
with Panama in early April 2016.
At the beginning, the authorities
believed these migrants came from
French-speaking West Africa, but
soon it became apparent that most
of them were Haitians, fleeing
hunger and unemployment in
Brazil. These particular migrants
did not find a warm welcome
from the US government, which
advised them to turn back or seek
refuge in other countries. The
northern Central American nations
concurred and blocked their borders
once again. Panama and Costa
Rica, however, the southernmost
nations of the Central American
isthmus, did not have the resources
(or the moral insensitivity) to
stop them. Arriving by foot, often
after enduring awful physical and
emotional conditions in Colombia
and Ecuador, many (mostly women)

claimed they had been subject to
horrific abuse from national security
forces and armed, non-state actors.
Between April 2016 and early
2017, some 23,000 Haitians, out
of more than 200,000 living in
Brazil since 2010, passed through
Costa Rica, and this is probably
an underestimate. Because of
their large numbers and total
dependency on official support, the
Haitians stayed in camps serviced
by the Costa Rican Red Cross and
the Ministries of Public Security,
Health, and Social Affairs. Unlike
the Cubans who came before them,
the Haitians knew that they could
not count on government support to
travel north. They moved faster in
and out of the camps (or did not use
them at all), seeking a way out of
Costa Rica with the help of coyotes as
soon as they could, despite efforts by
the Costa Rican police to stop them.
This complicated the recording of
names, many of which were false
from the outset. Linguistic issues
further complicated many cases.
Adults traveling with children often
lacked the documentation to prove
their parenthood, and cultural issues
and racism clouded the relations
between the migrants and local
communities. The situation created
a significant challenge for the Costa
Rican authorities, especially due
to the need to address security
concerns regarding the likely

presence among the migrants of
nationals from Sudan, Oman and
Yemen, countries alleged to harbor
terrorist organizations.
The Haitian exodus slowed
significantly in 2018, when Brazil
renewed its commitment to support
its migrant community. By then,
thousands of Haitians had traveled
to Chile and Peru, where they
received refuge. Many others were
discouraged from travel to the US
by the Trump Administration’s open
hostility to migrants. The migration
phenomenon is latent, however, and
could restart at any time. This is an
era of human mobility, and Latin
America and the Caribbean are no
exceptions to that rule. If massive
and sustained, migrations could
create immense havoc, especially
in smaller nations, but even in
bigger ones, as the VenezuelanColombian case clearly shows. In
times of global fear and uncertainty,
governments in the region would do
well to prepare a contingency plan
for this scenario.
Luis G. Solís is the former President of
Costa Rica and currently serves as Visiting
Distinguished Professor of Latin American
Studies at the Kimberly Green Latin
American and Caribbean Center at Florida
International University.
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Opportunities and Challenges for
Haitian Migrants in Chile
by Roody Reserve

I

mmigration plays an
important role in Haiti’s
economy and welfare, not
only for those Haitians who
decide to leave the country in
search of a better life, but also for
those who stay behind. According
to Luis Felipe López Calva, United
Nations Assistant Secretary General
and UNDP Regional Director for
Latin American and the Caribbean,
as of 2017 more than one-third
of Haiti’s GDP depended on
remittances from citizens living
abroad, the highest level in Latin
America. Public opinion data from
AmericasBarometer reveal that in
any given year from 2008 through
2017, at least 50% of Haitians
reported that their households
received remittances from family
members or friends living abroad,
with a peak of 66% in 2012. In
the same period, at least one-fifth
reported depending heavily on
these remittances.

A Haitian migrant carries a backpack as he walks to board a
Chilean military plane taking him back to Haiti at the Military
Air Base in Santiago, on November 7, 2018. Some 1000 Haitians
registered in a “voluntary return plan” launched by the Chilean
government. The program was aimed at any of the 165,000
Haitians who lived in Chile in 2018 and wished to return to their
country after failing to adapt. MARTIN BERNETTI/AFP via
Getty Images.
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Emigration is one of the few
options left to young Haitians faced
with political tensions, repression
and dire economic situations due to
natural disasters and bad decision
making by economic and political
elites. The necessity to migrate has
been particularly acute since the end
of the Duvalier dictatorship in the
mid 1980s. After repeated failed
attempts to institute meaningful
political changes, many Haitians,
especially the young and educated,
have determined that the best way to

secure a better life for themselves and
their families is to “vote with their
feet,” abandoning their dream to
transform the country from within.
It is in this context that a new wave
of migrants has set its sights on South
America, and Chile in particular.
As of late 2018, according
to Chile’s National Institute of
Statistics, the country was home to
179,338 Haitians. They represented
14.3% of all foreigners in Chile, the
third most numerous nationality
after Venezuelans and Peruvians.
The influx has been rapid; the 2012
census, for example, did not even
list Haitians among foreigners
residing in Chile. Why has Chile
experienced such a surge of Haitian
migrants in recent years? What is
their situation in the country?
What kind of challenges have they
faced in a context of social unrest
and instability?
In search of new destinations
After the massive earthquake that
struck Haiti in January 2010, it was
clear to most observers that a massive
influx of aid would be necessary, not
only to bring immediate help to the
survivors, but also to give a modicum
of hope to young people that they
would be able to rebuild their lives
in Haiti. Two years earlier, in 2008,
Hurricanes Fay, Gustav, Hanna and
Ike devastated Gonaïves, the fourth
largest Haitian city. The estimated
US$1 billion in economic damages
from these hurricanes, combined
with $8 billion from the earthquake,
meant that in just two years Haiti

had lost nearly 50% of its GDP to
natural disasters.
At a 2010 donors conference in
New York, a range of governments
and organizations promised more
than US$10 billion to reconstruct
the country. In practice, however,
not all of this support materialized,
and a good part of the aid that did
was lost to corruption and bad
administrative decisions, further
debilitating the Haitian state. In this
context, many Haitiains, especially
young people, turned to emigration
as one of the only feasible options left
to build their future.
Chile, Brazil and other South
American countries were especially
attractive destinations. Some Haitians
had had contact with military
representatives from these countries,
thanks to their participation in the
UN Mission for Stabilization in
Haiti (MINUSTAH). In interviews
conducted in 2010 in Chile, many
Haitian migrants said that their
decision to immigrate to that country
was in part motivated by friends
from the Chilean army who had been
stationed in Haiti. Just as important
was the fact that Chile was at that
time one of the few countries where
Haitians could travel without a visa.
The treatment accorded Haitians
in the Dominican Republic was
another factor redirecting the flow
of migration. In 2013, after many
years of propaganda against Haitians,
the Dominican Constitutional
Court decided that children born to
migrants without legal status in the
Hemisphere Volume 29
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country would not be considered
Dominican nationals. The ruling was
said to be applicable retroactively
to 1929. Scores of Dominicans
of Haitian decent would lose the
nationality they had acquired by
birth. Many Haitians left the
Dominican Republic for Chile
following this ruling. According to
journalist Jonathan M. Katz, and
based on data from Human Rights
Watch, from 2015-2018 Dominican
authorities deported an estimated
70,000 to 80,000 people of Haitian
descent—more than a quarter of
the Dominico-Haitian population.
By late 2018, the Dominican
government has only restored
citizenship documents to about
19,000 of those denationalized in the
five years since the ruling.
Chile’s reception of
Haitian migrants
When the current wave of
immigration started, in 2010 and
2011, Haitians migrants were
mostly well received in Chile. In
personal interviews conducted with
new arrivals attending free Spanishlanguage classes in Santiago, migrants
from Haiti usually declared that, in
spite of difficulty adapting to the
language and the climate, they felt
that they would be able to integrate
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into Chilean society. Racism was not
the first obstacle they identified in
their attempts to settle in Chile.
As the number of Haitian migrants
has increased, however, along with
increasing migration from Venezuela,
Colombia and the Dominican
Republic, this has changed. From
2014 to 2017, the Haitian presence
in Chile grew by an astounding
4,433%. In the same period, the
number of Venezuelans increased
by 1057% and Colombians, 507%.
Perhaps because of the increased
pressure on Chilean resources, the
welcome Haitians once received
in that country has begun to wear
thin. Many Haitian migrants in
Chile experience food insecurity.
They are also reported to be the
subject of most of the debate about
immigration in Chile, even though
they do not represent the largest
group of foreigners in the country.
The conversation is mostly negative
and tainted by racism.
The growing presence of
Haitians in Chile has meant that
their importance to the Haitian
economy has soared, as well. Some
studies show Chile in second place
in the amount of remittances sent
to Haiti, after the United States
and Canada.

The challenges ahead
As the citizens of Chile grapple
with the reality of a more diverse
society, many challenges lie ahead
for Haitian migrants. First, they face
an urgent need to better organize
with other migrant communities to
develop a collective response to the
suspicious attitudes and sometimes
blatant racism they encounter in
some sectors of society. Second,
they will need diplomatic support
from state officials in Haiti to better
protect their status abroad.
The current context of political
unrest in Chile, where the discussion
centers around a new social pact
aimed at alleviating inequality,
offers an opportunity to find ways
to integrate migrants into Chilean
society. It represents a chance
to change the prevailing view of
immigrants as a source of cheap
labor whose vulnerability is easily
exploited to deny them basic human
rights. With improved organization
and the support of the many Chilean
organizations that actively support
migrant communities, the new social
pact under debate could take up
the challenge to contribute to social
integration, a feature that is lacking
in the current discussion about
migrant communities in Chile.
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Nicaraguan and Cuban homeless migrants demonstrate outside the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office to demand help
during the coronavirus pandemic in San José, Costa Rica on April 21, 2020. EZEQUIEL BECERRA/AFP via Getty Images.

Migration from Nicaragua
to Costa Rica and the Impact
of COVID-19 (2018-2020)
by Alberto Cortés Ramos

M

igratory flows
between
Nicaragua and
Costa Rica run
in a north/south
direction. Two key factors explain
this trend: first, the consistently
stable political environment in
Costa Rica, in contrast to the
authoritarian and violent nature
of political regimes throughout
Nicaraguan history; and second,
the dynamics of the Costa Rican

productive system, in particular, the
need for foreign labor to harvest
crops and fill other jobs local
workers are unwilling to perform,
such as construction and domestic
chores. A third factor, which has
gained importance in recent years,
is the strength of the Costa Rican
social security and educational
systems. These benefits are generally
available to all of the country’s
inhabitants, regardless of their
citizenship or migratory status.

The dynamics of migration
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica
Since the end of the nineteenth
century, political and economic
factors have driven migration cycles
from Nicaragua to Costa Rica.
Significant migration began in the
1880s, when Nicaraguans helped
build the railway to Costa Rica's
Caribbean coast. Later, and until
the middle of the twentieth century,
thousands of Nicaraguan workers
sustained the banana plantations in
the Caribbean and Pacific lowlands.
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A constant flow of political refugees
joined the flood of migrants
during the years of the Somoza
dynasty (1936-1979), growing in
significance in the early 1970s, when
repression and political violence
increased and the Sandinista Front
for National Liberation (FSLN)
used Costa Rica as a strategic
rearguard in the final stages of its
war against the dictatorship.
By the time of the Sandinista
victory in July 1979, an estimated
80,000 Nicaraguan migrants resided
in Costa Rica. A decade later, after
the abuses of the Sandinista regime
and the US-funded contra war, the
number had risen to more than
120,000, nearly 40,000 of them
enjoying refugee status. Most of this
population returned to Nicaragua
in 1990, after the electoral triumph
of President Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro over Daniel Ortega,
but the returnees’ dream of a
new Nicaragua characterized by
democracy, peace and prosperity
soon proved elusive.
The profound transformations of
the early 1990s ushered in a new
cycle of political and economic
instability in Nicaragua. Besieged
by an aggressive and well-organized
Sandinista opposition, harassed by
its own political allies, and coping
with the adjustments to newly
acquired democratic institutions
(privatizations, disarmament of
the contras, transformation of the
Sandinista Party militia into a true
National Armed Force, election
of a non-partisan judiciary, severe
droughts and recurrent famine in
the northern highlands, among
other pressures), the Chamorro
government was incapable of
ensuring economic growth and
internal peace. At the same time,
Costa Rica was beginning a cycle
of economic diversification and
26
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expansion. Observing the contrast
between the two countries, urban
and rural Nicaraguans alike resumed
their pilgrimage to the south in what
would become the largest migration
cycle in binational history.
In 1999, as a result of a pact with
President Arnoldo Aleman, the FSLN
gained new status as a political power
broker, culminating in Ortega’s
return to the presidency in 2006.
Despite his refusal to surrender
political power in several electoral
processes marred with irregularities,
economic stability gradually returned
to Nicaragua. Largely resulting from
Ortega’s privileged relationship with
the Chávez and Maduro regimes in
Venezuela, Nicaragua’s GDP grew
by a consistent 5% between 2013
and 2018. Even so, census figures
show that between 2011 and 2020,
the Nicaraguan population in Costa
Rica grew from 287,766 to around
500,000, representing approximately
12% of the national population.
This is one of the highest percentages
in Latin America, especially
considering Costa Rica’s size (only
50,000 sq. km, a little smaller
than Alabama, Arkansas or North
Carolina), and its weak economy,
which was already faltering prior to
the COVID-19 pandemic.
A new cycle of Nicaraguan
migration to Costa Rica began on
April 18, 2018 when the Nicaraguan
government announced a series
of social security reforms that
included taxing pensions. Protests
by university students, civil society
activists, feminists and senior citizens
affected by the reforms were violently
suppressed by FSLN shock forces and
the National Police. The crackdown
was broadcast live for more than three
hours on national television and went
viral on social media soon after. The
official repression spurred even more
students to take to the streets over

the following days and to occupy
the public university campuses. The
regime's reaction was brutal and
unexpected; instead of seeking a
negotiated settlement of the crisis, the
government authorized paramilitary
groups and the National Police to
step up their use of violence against
the protesters. By May, some 360
people (mostly unarmed civilians)
had been killed or disappeared, more
than 600 imprisoned without trial,
and dozens of women raped in one
of the most violent state-sponsored
terror campaigns in Nicaragua since
1979. Unyielding to international
pressure and direct appeals from the
United Nations, the Vatican and the
Organization of American States,
and determined not to allow any
signs of internal fractures, the regime
continued its repressive actions,
forcing many opponents – students
and journalists, in particular – to seek
asylum in Costa Rica.
Between January and March 2018,
the Costa Rican authorities received
only 22 refugee applications from
Nicaraguans. By early June, after
snipers attacked the Mother’s Day
parade in Managua, the number of
applications rose to 3344, and in
July, it reached 5279. Between June
2018 and March 2020, an average of
2900 Nicaraguans applied for refugee
status in Costa Rica every month,
for a total of about 70,000 new
applicants in two years.
Fiscal and economic pressures
in Costa Rica
The Costa Rican government,
coping with a critical financial
situation and resulting social conflict
in the second half of 2018, could not
have foreseen the abrupt arrival of
tens of thousands of people fleeing
violence and repression in Nicaragua.
At the time, unemployment in
Costa Rica stood at more than 10%,

A Nicaraguan activist wears a face mask
and goggles to prevent the spread of
coronavirus while he distributes food to
Nicaraguan migrants living on the streets
of San José, Costa Rica, on April 16,
2020. EZEQUIEL BECERRA/AFP via
Getty Images.
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further complicating the insertion
of the arriving migrants into the
labor market. The adverse economic
context inhibited the ability of the
Costa Rican authorities to channel
public resources toward the migrant
influx, but even scant support
triggered xenophobic reactions from
some sectors of the local population.
On August 18, a small but vocal
protest erupted in the capital of
San José calling for the expulsion of
Nicaraguans from the country. Most
Costa Ricans rejected the protesters’
tone as well as their demands, but
the implications were clear: an illhandled migration policy could have
serious consequences for social peace.
With the support of the United
Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Organization for
Migrations and other civil society
organizations, the Costa Rican
authorities expedited identification
cards and work permits for
migrants within three months
of application for refugee status.
This allows for the regularization
of employment conditions while
improving the personal and family
situations of refugees in the country.
Nevertheless, Costa Rica has a
rigid policy for granting refugee
status. Only 25% of all cases are
approved. The explanation for
this seemingly Draconian policy
is twofold: on the one hand, the
government fears that the easing of
refugee status could be interpreted
as an open-door policy that would
encourage an uncontrollable flow of
migrants; on the other hand, there
are well-grounded concerns that
flexibilization could open the door
to people linked to international
criminal networks, particularly the
so-called maras (gangs), traveling
through Nicaragua from the
Northern Triangle of El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras.
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Characteristics of the Nicaraguan
refugee population
The latest wave of migrants to
Costa Rica from Nicaragua is very
different from those that preceded
it. To begin with, the motivation
for leaving Nicaragua is mostly
political. Today’s migrants are often
civil and political activists, journalists
or human rights defenders fleeing
persecution under the Ortega regime.
In terms of social capital, they have
a higher level of education and,
because of their practical experience
as activists, a greater capacity to
make themselves heard and claim
their rights. University students,
professionals, and civil, political
and intellectual leaders figure
prominently among the migrants.
They are a highly connected
community that has managed to
maintain an important level of
articulation based on territorial,
political and sectoral affinities.
Thanks to their social networks,
these migrants also maintain
relationships with their families,
communities and organizations
in Nicaragua, transforming their
linkages into a truly transnational
social space. In Costa Rica, they are
able to engage in online activism
impossible to pursue in Nicaragua
due to government restrictions.
Unlike previous waves of migrants,
who tended to send remittances home
to their families, the new arrivals
receive support from their relatives
in Nicaragua and other countries,
especially the United States.
Those migrants from rural areas
also behave differently than their
predecessors. Most have resisted
insertion into the agribusiness
plantations along Costa Rica’s
northern border, choosing to rent
land and cultivate it themselves.
For them, producing food for

their organizations and fending for
themselves is a way of resisting and
fighting the Ortega regime. In this
process, they have demonstrated
a great political, productive and
organizational capacity.
Despite the initiative they have
shown, Nicaraguans seeking
refuge in Costa Rica since 2018
have faced significant obstacles,
including employment. Those with
professional careers have struggled
to validate their credentials in Costa
Rica. Previous waves of Nicaraguan
migrants typically sought unskilled
jobs that paid the worst salaries
and for which there was little local
competition, but newer arrivals
may be perceived as a threat to the
Costa Rican professional sector,
potentially competing for jobs in a
context of economic crisis and high
unemployment. This could become
an even more serious problem
following the COVID-19 crisis.
A second critical issue for newly
arrived migrants is gaining access
to the public health system. While
historically Costa Rica has given
Nicaraguans direct access to health
care, new requirements and obstacles
are inhibiting migrants from
receiving services. Institutionalized
xenophobia hinders the foreign
population from accessing health
services even in an emergency,
including some cases when
individuals have insurance.
The COVID 19 crisis and the
refugee population
In March 2020, the COVID-19
pandemic hit Central America and
the rest of the world. While the
impact the pandemic will have on
migration flows from Nicaragua into
Costa Rica in the coming months
and years is still uncertain, several
changes can already be observed.

First, the flow of migrants has
decreased significantly. In response
to the pandemic, many Nicaraguans
returned to their home country,
reacting both to the strict measures
taken by Costa Rica in closing
its borders and the prospect of
deteriorating economic conditions.
Facing the possibility of a productive
catastrophe in Costa Rica, many
migrants chose to return to their
home country, despite the risks.
Second, the Costa Rican
government implemented the socalled “Protect Bond,” a 3-month
payment of between US$110 and
$220 to people without income
or whose wages were significantly
diminished by the crisis. The bonus
was also available to refugees and
asylum seekers with a provisional
identity card, a group representing
about half of the total migrant
population. Despite efforts by
UNHCR to support those who had
not yet regularized their immigration
status, a good part of the migrant
population faced destitution.
Third, the Ortega-Murillo regime’s
irresponsible management of the
COVID-19 pandemic1 has raised
grave concerns in Costa Rica that
thousands of sick Nicaraguans will
be forced to travel to neighboring
countries for health services that
their own government is unable to
provide. In that scenario, it would
not be farfetched to imagine a
collapse of the Costa Rican medical
system and mass infection of the
local population. This fear was fueled
by the rapidly increasing numbers
of COVID-19 patients filling the

already insufficient and ill-equipped
hospital space in Nicaragua and
the detection of dozens of migrants
testing positive for COVID-19 in the
border region. These migrants were
quarantined and hospitalized at once,
but such reports raised concerns of
a xenophobic reaction against the
refugee population in the country.
One final element to note is
that the seasonal rural migrants
who travel to Costa Rica for
relatively short periods of time (4
to 9 months) will not be allowed
to enter the country until the
pandemic is significantly under
control. Given the dependence of
transnational agrobusiness on this
foreign workforce, the potential
labor shortage has created alarm that
crops could be lost. Any relaxation
of border restrictions to allay these
concerns or attempts to thwart the
regulations could become a source
of coronavirus infection throughout
the country.
Nobody can know how the
pandemic will evolve in Costa
Rica and Nicaragua, but even
without it the political crisis
surrounding the Ortega regime
is far from over and could enter
another acute phase as national
elections approach in 2021. The
economic scenario does not look
positive for any country in Central
America, much less for Nicaragua,
given the untrustworthiness of the
government, the sanctions it faces
from the US and other international
actors, and the productive disarray
caused by the increasingly repressive
and dictatorial Ortega regime.

1
As of this writing, Ortega refused to acknowledge the threat that the COVID-19 pandemic
represented for the Nicaraguan people and dismissed the “stay at home” campaign promoted
by the opposition and civil society organizations. The Ministry of Health failed to provide reliable
information and statistics, let alone testing for the virus. FSLN party structures throughout
Nicaragua, following Ortega’s orders, promoted mass gathering without any consideration for
social distancing.
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Population Movements
and Climate Change
by Gabriela Hoberman & Juan Pablo Sarmiento

H

uman societies are
already experiencing
the effects of
climate change.
These include
both slow-onset processes, such as
changes in evaporation patterns
and accelerated sea-level rise,
and disasters triggered by rapidonset events or shocks, including
intense high/low temperatures,
precipitation, tropical storms and
forest fires. At any given time, the
underlying risk factors associated
with development processes poverty, marginality, land tenure
and land use issues, inequality, and
access to social services, among them
- cumulatively influence and shape
these chronic stresses and shocks.
Human population movements are
one consequence of the convergence
of climate change, extreme events,
and underlying socio-economic
risk factors.
Although no clear cause and effect
has been established to explain
this relationship, an upward trend
in population movements can be
foreseen as an extreme adaptation
strategy in response to climate
change, extreme weather events, or
disasters. Many such migrations
occur when people are left with
no other viable option. These
movements are generally called
‘displacements’ when they occur
within a country, and ‘migration’
when the movement crosses
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national borders. The International
Organization for Migration
defines environmental migrants
as “persons or groups of persons
who, for compelling reasons of
sudden or progressive change in the
environment that adversely affects
their lives or living conditions,
are obliged to leave their habitual
homes, or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, and
who move either within their
country or abroad.” In 2018, the
World Bank estimated that SubSaharan Africa, South Asia, and
Latin America together could be
dealing with more than 140 million
internal climate-displaced people
by 2050.
Global studies of climate
variability and international
migration show that disasters
associated with natural hazards,
measured as the sum of episodes
with short-term environmental
shocks, are associated with increased
emigration. The natural and direct
short-term consequence of certain
socio-natural disasters, such as
severe floods, hurricanes, or forest
fires, is for people to move away
from the affected regions to save
their lives. In 2017, according
to the Swiss-based Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre,
natural disasters alone accounted
for the displacement of 17.2
million people globally. To take an
example from the United States,
estimates suggest that between
100,000 and 150,000 evacuees

moved to Houston to escape
Hurricane Katrina in August 2009.
In total, 80% of the population,
or approximately 385,000 people,
left New Orleans due to the same
event and caused a massive increase
in labor supply in the surrounding
regions. In other parts of the world,
severe earthquakes or volcanic
eruptions often cause parts of the
local population to leave home,
at least temporarily. When the
occurrence of a certain socio-natural
disaster is predictable, short-term
migration could begin even before
the disaster. In September 2017,
Hurricane Irma provoked the largest
evacuation in the history of Florida,
with hundreds of thousands of
inhabitants moving north to seek
safer conditions.
Disasters can occur anywhere,
but developing countries are
the most vulnerable to their
effects. According to the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre,
Belize, Cuba, and Haiti were among
the 10 countries with the largest
disaster displacements relative to
population in 2018. These and other
developing countries are unable
to improve their resilience preevent or efficiently manage postdisaster effects. In many countries,
remittance play an important
mitigating role, helping build
resilience and reducing the adverse
effects of disasters on household
livelihood. Without financial
liquidity, migration is less likely
to occur in response to slow-onset

Bahamian climate refugees of Hurricane Dorian arrive at the Kendal GL Isaacs National Gym on September 6, 2019, in Nassau, New Providence.
Over 70,000 were left homeless while thousands more evacuated to the US. BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images.

events. Even in rapid-onset events,
liquidity restrictions may force
many people to relocate only
temporarily or embark on shortdistance movements.
Findings such as the ones
discussed above have helped improve
our understanding of the effect
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empirical studies of the effects
of climate and socio-natural
disasters on population movements
differ in several dimensions,
including sample type, timelines,
displaced/migrant approach,
retrospective/prospective studies,
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and measurement techniques.
An agreement on standards
would represent an important
step in allowing us to advance
methodologically and deepen our
understanding of this ever-growing
threat to human security.
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all aspects of women's lives. As
reported in the World Economic
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report
2018, according to time-use data
from 29 countries, one-third of
them in Latin America, women
spend on average twice as much
time as men on housework, and
especially care activities. Dedicating
more time to these types of duties
inevitably inhibits their ability to
engage in any type of paid labor.

Migrant Mother’s Day.
Central American mothers
and their children in a migrant
shelter in Juárez, Mexico,
on May 10, 2019.
DAVID PEINADO/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

Women Migrants in Latin America:
Following World Trends?
by Alejandra Mora Mora

W

omen have
played an
active role in
migrations
throughout
history, but in recent years their
numbers have increased, along with
the complexity of the situations they
face. Highlighting and identifying
gender-differentiated impacts and
their interconnections in the lives of
the more than 120 million migrant
32
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women and girls in the world
today contributes to humanize the
specificity of their experiences and
shed light on the female dimensions
of this phenomenon in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and
around the world.
The more visible women and girls
are in migratory flows, the greater
our chances of understanding and
addressing specific regional trends.

This article, therefore, calls attention
to two crosscutting phenomena that,
in addition to factors such as poverty
and insecurity, typically accompany
migrant women on their journeys:
domestic care and violence.
The sexual division of labor that
assigns women to care not only
for sons and daughters, but also
older adults and family members
with disabilities or illness, affects

Domestic care is also central to
the migration process for women.
On the one hand, women forced to
leave their dependents behind, or
send them alone under the care of
a relative or even a stranger, suffer
from anxiety and feelings of guilt.
This becomes especially traumatic
in the case of minors. On the
other hand, women who care
for dependents during migratory
journeys face both physical and
psychological exhaustion. The long
journeys migrants endure often cause
health problems such as dehydration,
sunburn and other conditions
aggravated by severe food shortages,
particularly in children and older
people who require special care.
If they are fortunate enough to
reach their destinations, the sexual
division of labor and lack of job
skills required by more competitive
labor markets relegate many migrant
women to domestic work, often
in conditions characterized by a
total lack of protection. For these
women, social security regimes
are inaccessible, and poverty
is perpetuated.
Countries that collect data on
the labor behavior of foreigners can
attest to the prevalence of women in
the domestic sector. In Costa Rica,
a 2013 study by the International
Organization for Migration found
that the majority of migrant men

(mostly Nicaraguan) worked in
agriculture, manufacturing and
construction, while women were
concentrated in the manufacturing
and service industries, where they
earned among the lowest wages
in the salary structure, and in
household activities, including
domestic care.
Migrant women hired to provide
domestic labor, both within Latin
America and in destination countries
such as the United States, afford their
women employers the opportunity
to work in other more permanent
and profitable formal sectors of the
economy. This in turn denies the
very same opportunity to the migrant
women they employ. The scenario
essentially generates a zero sum cycle
of discrimination and inequality and
one of negative interdependence. Yet,
this phenomenon is seldom registered
in national statistics because it
occurs in the private sphere, is driven
by informal hiring practices, and
often functions within a context
worthy of social and moral critique.
Paradoxically, the same migrants that
are maligned as being undesirable or
less capable simply due to their socioeconomic status, cultural differences
or ethnicity are brought into their
employers’ homes to care for their
children and elderly members of the
family, cook their food, and work in
the most intimate corners of their
domestic sphere.
Violence is another crosscutting
phenomenon for female migrants.
In addition to domestic violence,
a frequent driver of migration
for women, pervasive organized
crime also spurs many women (for
example, in the so-called Northern
Triangle of Central America, formed
by Guatemala, Honduras and El
Salvador) to flee environments
dominated by gangs and permanent
social conflict.

Unfortunately, flight creates
its own risk of violence. Migrant
women are subject of multiple
forms of violence, including sexual
violence, “sextorsion” and rape,
and may be driven by deception
or coercion into sex labor or
trafficking. Complaints of sexual
violence have even been made
against border security agents and
migration services. Many such
accounts were shared by the Cuban
and Haitian migrants passing
through Costa Rica from Ecuador
during the 2015-2017 exodus.
In response to the problem
of trafficking, the Follow-up
Mechanism to the Belém do Pará
Convention (MESECVI) urged
the 32 signatory states to adopt the
standards of the United Nations
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children
(Palermo Protocol). Unfortunately,
the legislation and its effective
implementation are still pending in
most countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean.
In 2016, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) identified more
than 25,000 trafficked persons,
noting that the figure has been
rising consistently since 2011.
According to UNODC, trafficking
in persons includes abuses such as
sexual exploitation, forced labor
or exploitation. In 70% of cases
worldwide, the victims were women
and girls. In Central America
and the Caribbean, 55% of the
victims were girls and 25% adult
women. In South America, of the
3,000 victims identified, 31% were
girls and 51% women. The most
common complaint was sexual
exploitation. Many migrant women
do not report violent incidents
for fear of official reprisals that
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could lead to deportation. This
intimidation weakens efforts to
identify and protect the victims, as
well as the administration of justice
for violence against women at each
stage of the migration process.
For migrant women from the
region fortunate enough to reach
the United States, the difficulty
of quantifying the true extent of
the violence they encounter often
works against them in the asylum
process. In a 2006 study, Ana Silvia
Monzón reported that in the five
years previous, the US authorities
recognized a total of just 856 women
from Mexico and Central America
as refugees. The granting of refugee
status is a complex procedure
whose fairness and legality has been
repeatedly challenged, without
success, by many NGOs and
humanitarian groups.
From a feminist perspective,
migrant women and girls face a
double invisibility with regard to
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the actors who are supposed to
protect them: first, because they
are women whose specific realities
are not adequately taken into
account; and second, because their
particular situations are undervalued
to the point of ceasing to be a
priority on the state agenda. In
practice, this double invisibility
has concrete implications for the
rights of migrant women and girls.
Specifically, the economic impact
of the domestic labor women
supply cannot be measured in a
satellite account, nor do concepts
exist to understand this situation
in relation to, and differentially
from, men’s labor. In addition,
women’s work is characterized by
inconsistent remuneration and a
lack of regulation and public debate
on working conditions. As for
violence against migrant women,
there is a lack of formal channels
for registering complaints or raising
awareness of the problem, resulting
in widespread impunity that puts
the lives of women and girls at risk.

Due to all of these factors,
migrant women do not perceive
the same benefits and guarantees
or the same autonomy and
economic independence from
their participation in productive
employment as do men.
Consequently, poverty, violence
and discrimination in migratory
movements increasingly have a
woman’s face, body and soul,
intensified and conditioned further
by race or ethnicity, social class
and age.

United Nations Office on Drugs and
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Only precise and differentiated
statistical recording, along with fair
and effective implementation of
legislation, policies and programs
aimed at managing human flows
that address specific needs, will
help us move closer to the goal
of enabling thousands of migrant
women in Latin America and the
Caribbean to live their lives in
certainty and without fear.

HIV Testing Booth in Lummus Park on Ocean Drive
in South Beach, Miami Beach’s most popular tourist area.
JEFFREY GREENBERG/Universal Images Group via Getty Images.

South Florida: HIV/Drug Epidemics,
Immigrant Ethnic Sexual Minorities
and Tourism
by José Félix Colón Burgos

G

eographically, the
Florida peninsula is
situated between two
regions with high
HIV prevalence rates:
the southeastern United States and
the Caribbean. In 2017, 52% of
new HIV diagnoses in the US were
in the South (17 states, including
Florida). In 2018, Florida had the
third-highest HIV case rate (23.4
per 100,000 people) of any state
in the US, twice as high as the
national average, and the South
Florida tri-county region (Miami-

Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
counties) had the country’s highest
rate of HIV infection diagnoses.
The same region also contains the
two US metropolitan areas with the
highest HIV case rates: Miami and
Ft. Lauderdale (44.0 and 32.0 per
100,000, respectively). Nationally,
Miami-Dade County ranks number
one in new HIV infections.
The burden of HIV/AIDS is highly
concentrated among immigrant
ethnic, sexual, and gender minorities,
with an observed increase among

Hispanic/Latinx’s from subgroups
such as gay-identified men, non-gayidentified men who have sex with
men (MSMs), and transgender or
gender variant persons. According
to Gilbert & Rhodes (2013), these
populations “constitute a particularly
vulnerable subgroup which may
be marginalized along multiple
dimensions, including immigration
status, language use, ethnic minority
status, gender identity, or sexual
orientation.” A resurgence in stimulant
use (cocaine, methamphetamines)
is also related to a higher risk of
acquiring HIV/AIDS, especially
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within sexual minority groups such
as MSMs. Studies consistently show
that MSMs who use stimulants
have a three-to sixfold greater risk
of HIV seroconversion. This trend
is corroborated by comparable
increases in methamphetamine use
and methamphetamine-induced
deaths in South Florida.
HIV/drug use epidemics
and tourism
The above statistics demonstrate
the severity of the HIV/drug
epidemic in South Florida, a region
with a robust tourism sector.
According to the Greater Miami
Convention & Visitors Bureau, in
2018 the Miami tourism industry
received a total of 23.3 million
people (international, domestic and
Florida locals), employed 142,100
workers, and is estimated to have
accounted for $18 billion of the local
economy. As a number of global
research projects have shown, tourism
areas generate conditions of HIV
and drug abuse vulnerability, often
through linkages to sex tourism,
elevated rates of risky behaviors, and
high rates of illicit drug use.
In South Florida, migration and
mobility related to tourism are factors
closely linked to the rising incidence
of HIV among MSMs in the
region. A recent study reported that
31.2% of 125 HIV-negative MSMs
seroconverted within five years of
migrating to tourist areas in South
Florida, supporting the idea that
MSMs who move to these areas are at
heightened vulnerability to the virus.
Exposure to circuit parties and ‘party
drugs’ (e.g., methamphetamines,
cocaine, and Ecstasy) has also been
found to exacerbate an existing
social climate of disinhibition and
abandonment of sexual norms in
MSM tourism environments.
This is the reality that immigrant
36
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ethnic sexual and gender minorities,
such as Latinx MSMS (LMSMS),
often encounter when migrating or
moving to the South Florida area,
especially Miami Dade County.
Whether motivated by a desire
to escape economic or political
instability, or marginalized by
homophobic and conservative
heteronormative cultures in their
home communities, these men move
to South Florida in search of a new
life of prosperity, equal rights, and
greater acceptance of their sexual
identities and orientation. At the
same time, however, they can end
up exposing themselves to a highrisk setting for HIV and drug abuse.
Many new arrivals have no idea of
the health vulnerability they will
encounter in South Florida, especially
if they work in the tourism sector.
The pilot study and its results
Between July 2018 and June 2019,
I implemented a pilot exploratory
study to gather the experiences of
recent (5 years or less) and more
established LMSM immigrants (both
US- and foreign-born) working
in the tourism sector on Miami’s
South Beach. Tourism is one of
the only economic sectors in which
LMSMs, whether documented
or undocumented, can find work
in the formal or informal market.
Guided by a previous study of the
Caribbean tourism environment and
Padilla’s theoretical tourism ecological
framework, I employed several
data collection methods. First, I
conducted informal interviews with
18 informants, 13 of them from
organizations that work on HIV/
AIDS prevention and treatment in
Miami-Dade and Broward County,
to gather information regarding
the social context of HIV in South
Florida. Second, I recruited a
theoretical sample of 36 LMSM
migrant tourism workers and

conducted in-depth qualitative, semistructured interviews with them to
examine their perspectives on factors
that shape the dual epidemics of drug
use and HIV/AIDS in South Florida.
Of the interviewees, 36.1%(n=13)
were born in Venezuela, 22.2%
(n=8) in Cuba, 11.1%(n=4) in the
continental United States, 8.3%
(n=3) in Puerto Rico, and 5.6%(n=2)
in Argentina. The remaining
16.6%(n=6) were men born in Chile,
Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Panama and
Colombia. All of the participants’
names have been changed for the
purpose of this article.
One of the recent LMSM
immigrants was Juan, a 38-year-old
Venezuelan working at a Miami
Beach hotel. Many young Latino
immigrants, he noted, “arrive in this
country mainly undocumented….
Many people abuse them because
they believe or know that they need
papers and that they are an easy
target for sex. And they [locals]
go out with them for one or two
months, they have sex with the
newcomers and then they come
and go with the other, and another,
another, and another…”
When I asked Juan about his own
experience, he replied: “Today, I am
stable. I already feel much better, but
starting from scratch in the United
States was the most difficult stage in
my entire life….. It was not difficult
to leave home, it was not difficult
to start from zero in Caracas. But
starting from zero in the United
States was not easy. I could not get
a job because not having papers is ...
it’s not easy. I had to live in a studio
with a lady who rented a bunkbed.
Very difficult….”
At the time of the interview
(November 13, 2018), Juan had been
in Miami for three years.
He told me that in 2017 (about a

Nightlife is one of the main tourist attractions of South Beach. According to an Argentine undocumented immigrant and informal South Beach
tourist guide, “Paradise, vacation, sex, drugs; there cannot be one without the other.” E
 RICBARNS/Pixabay.

year and a half after arriving in South
Florida), he became infected with
HIV because of an accident with a
needle while injecting steroids into
his former partner. Regrettably, the
former partner did not inform Juan
that he was HIV positive. When
I asked Juan about his health and
how satisfied he was with the care
that he had received in Miami, he
answered in a very positive way but
noted that he felt sad that he cannot
go home and visit his family because
of his immigration status. Obtaining
the care he needs would also be
much more difficult in Venezuela,
he explained: “In Venezuela, there is
no way to have access to medicine.
For me, it would be impossible to
return to my country now that I have
acquired it [the virus].”

I heard a similar story from
Fernando, a 28-year-old Cuban-born
escort and former host at a popular
Ocean Drive restaurant. Like Juan,
Fernando finds himself isolated
from his family since becoming HIV
positive during his first few years in
Miami. “To go to Cuba and face
the reality and explain to my family
that I have a disease, they would
not understand it,” he maintained.
Fernando has lived in Miami for six
years, mostly in the South Beach area.
In the interview, he started to tell
me about his addiction to stimulants
– cocaine and methamphetamines
– and its connection to his informal
and formal tourism work. When I
asked Fernando if it was common
to consume stimulants in his line of
work, he replied: “No meth at work,

because meth is one of the most
followed drugs here by the police...
but yes, they use cocaine, all over the
beach, all waiters on the beach, all
the bartenders from the beach huelen
perico [snort cocaine].”
He went on to describe what is
informally called “party and play,” or
“chemsex,” a term used “to indicate
the voluntary intake of psychoactive
and non-psychoactive drugs in the
context of recreational settings to
facilitate and/or to enhance sexual
intercourse mostly among MSM”
(Giorgetti et al., 2017, p.762).
Methamphetamines are quite
common in this setting, according
to Fernando. “Actually, sex does not
make me feel anything anymore,” he
recounted. “You do it because of the
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addiction that the drug has. When
they mention it, you immediately
want to smoke.”
The social environment of tourism
exacerbates the risk or enables
this kind of “party”/chemsex

interaction. Miguel, a 34-year-old
undocumented immigrant from
Argentina working as an informal
tourist guide, summed up the
situation in poetic terms: “Tourism
is linked to the sub-world of sex
tourism, [and] the drug factor is the

axis or pillar that serves as the spark
for this social practice …. There
is a cohesion between them, and
one cannot exist without the other.
Paradise, vacation, sex, drugs; there
cannot be one without the other.”
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F., Zaami, S., Marinelli, E., & Busardò,
F. P. (2017). "When 'Chems' Meet
Sex: A Rising Phenomenon Called
'ChemSex.'” Current Neuropharmacology
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4/1570159x15666161117151148

Medley, G., Lipari, R., Bose, J.,
Cribb, D., Kroutil, L., & McHenry,
G. (2016). "Sexual Orientation and
Estimates of Adult Substance Use and
Mental Health: Results from the 2015
National Survey on Drug Use and
Health. Retrieved February 25, 2020."
Retrieved from https://www.samhsa.
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